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Reconciliation in Zimbabwe remains a recurring question despite several 
interventions by the government to respond to the challenge. Such efforts 
stretch as far back as the first decade of independence. A key observation 
about the failure of the interventions is the weak utilisation of localism. 
Yet other countries with similar historical experiences as Zimbabwe have 
recorded better progress by embracing community-based methods. Indeed, 
the traditional liberal view that there is a universal set of approaches to 
reconciliation has for long been discredited and it is now widely accepted 
that due to diverse cultural values, practices and norms, communities 
should approach reconciliation in diverse ways. The National Peace and 
Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) of Zimbabwe has the opportunity 
to learn from other developing countries on how community approaches 
unfolded, and apply such lessons in enriching its own programmes in the 
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country. The East Timor and Sierra Leone cases are adduced as providing 
practical and valuable insights upon which the NPRC can benchmark 
and refine its strategy, and take advantage of the idle pool of indigenous 
methods in the country. 
Keywords: community-based, reconciliation in practice, lessons, National 
Peace and Reconciliation Commission, Zimbabwe 
Introduction
The manner in which a society decides to deal with past violations of 
human rights determines the extent to which long-term stability and 
reconciliation may be achieved. Interventions should aim to prevent the 
recurrence of conf licts while repairing the damage caused. The history 
of political conf licts in Zimbabwe is well documented, but the attempted 
responses have largely ignored the micro-level realities, and have left the 
national reconciliation problem still lingering. As Zimbabwe remains 
politically and socially unstable, reconciliation, in my view, is a specific 
area of inquiry which urgently needs to be further investigated in order 
to turn the country into a place where citizens live in conditions of peace. 
This aspiration is implanted in Chapter 12 of the amended Constitution of 
Zimbabwe (2013), which established the National Peace and Reconciliation 
Commission (NPRC) to confront the irrepressible challenge of 
reconciliation. The Commission has a five-year mandate to address past 
conf licts extending to the pre-independence era. It became operational 
in 2018, following the publication of a Government Gazette on 5 January. 
The Commission embarked on nation-wide public consultations, beginning 
19 February 2018, to gather views on its strategic vision. One consistent 
theme that has emerged is greater inclusivity and public participation in 
the process and a lesser role for the government (National Transitional 
Justice Working Group Zimbabwe 2018). In other words, people have 
demanded ownership of the process. The local political dynamics do not 
require universal solutions, but rather local ones that are sensitive to the 
particular conditions for addressing both the process and its outputs.  
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A number of studies exist on reconciliation in Zimbabwe (see Tshuma 2019; 
Benyera 2014; Machinga and Friedman 2013; Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru 
2013; Mashingaidze 2011; Machakanja 2010, among others). These studies 
offer penetrating, irrepressible and factual critiques of reconciliation 
in the country. Most of these studies focus on universal and idealistic 
arguments with a bias towards prescriptive interventions (De Coning 
2018:301–303) characteristic of the liberal-democratisation discourse and 
its strong emphasis on retribution (see Mashingaidze 2011; Machakanja 
2010). Others have also examined the micro-level peacebuilding with 
much interest in conf lict resolution (Chivasa 2019:159–179; Mandikwaza 
2018:45–51; Makumbirofa 2016:61–73). This article seeks to add to the 
debate by identifying the empirical experiences of reconciliation in Sierra 
Leone and East Timor, and explores what lessons these cases may be able 
to offer to the NPRC once its outreach programmes are fully developed. 
I will start by introducing the brief context within which the history of 
institutional responses to address the conf lict has created the conditions 
which justify the persistent calls for more action from the NPRC. I then 
provide a conceptual framework where I link the concept of reconciliation 
to justice and localism/community-based approaches. This provides a 
context within which the experiences from Sierra Leone and East Timor can 
be situated. Along the way, I will demonstrate the most important lessons 
from the cases, and provide indicators on some local level initiatives that 
the NPRC can utilise to apply the recommended lessons. 
A brief historical context
Zimbabwe’s political history has been one of recurring violence 
since pre-independence. Violence was systematically established and 
institutionalised through colonial rule (Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru 2013; 
Moorcroft and McLaughlin 2008), and exported into the structures of 
the post-colonial state. The post-colonial episodes  of violence are well 
documented: the dissident-cleansing operation Gukurahundi carried out 
in the 1980s in the Southern parts of the country, which claimed several 
lives (Mhandara 2018:31); the ineluctable land reform programme that 
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was frequently tainted by violence (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 
2006:8); the 2005 Operation Murambatsvina to clean urban centres, which 
displaced more than 700 000 people (Bratton and Masunungure 2007:24); 
and, since 2000, related to elections, a trend of disruptive intra- and inter-
party political violence (Masunungure 2011; Sachikonye 2011; Staunton 
2009; Impunity Watch 2008). In recent years, violence has been aggravated 
by the conf lagration effects of factional politics in both the Zimbabwe 
African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF), and the Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC) formations.  
The government, at different intervals, characteristically reacted to the 
violence through a series of interventions meant to promote reconciliation. 
The most common reactions are brief ly annotated in the subsequent 
paragraphs.
Amnesia was very common during Mugabe’s rule – as an officially imposed 
form of forgetting (Huyse 2003:36). It entailed attempts to address the past 
by simply glossing over violations without any meaningful step to address 
the transgressions. Amnesia is usually paired with amnesty and pardons. 
It suppresses the past in the hope that a new peaceful dispensation will 
eventually emerge. Addressing past abuses is seen as unnecessary because 
of its potential to incite anger and hostility, thereby disrupting the new 
order (Rotberg and Thompson 2010:113). The inherent shortcoming of this 
approach is that it does not acknowledge the past, which continues to burden 
the society (Stovel 2008:305–324). In the absence of closure, perpetrators 
will continue to feel insecure whenever they meet their victims. In addition, 
amnesia encourages loss of memory and misinterpretation of history. 
The pattern of amnesia in Zimbabwe was already established in 1979 during 
the transition from white minority rule to black majority rule, when both the 
Rhodesian Front and liberation movements were indemnified from abuses 
committed during the war of independence (Human Rights Watch 2011; 
Mashingaidze 2011:21; Huyse 2003:36). This set a precedent for immunity 
from impunity, commencing with the 1980 policy of racial reconciliation 
with its pillars on ‘forgiving and forgetting’ (De Waal 1990:45 cited in 
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Raftopoulos and Savage 2004:64). Immunities, indemnities, clemencies, 
pardons and amnesties lie at the heart of the country’s failure to deal with 
gross violations of human rights, and has effectively imposed an approach 
which further boosted impunity (Sachikonye 2011:67; Huyse 2003:36; 
Raftopoulos and Savage 2004:51). 
Commissions of inquiry also featured glaringly under Mugabe’s rule. 
A commission of inquiry can be defined as a body established in terms of 
the laws of a given state to examine the factual causes and circumstances 
of a specific issue (Brassil 2004:125). A commission of inquiry’s terms 
of reference normally lead to a report which contains findings and 
recommendations, which the convenor must act upon to rectify the 
situation. Commissions of inquiry are valued because of the expert 
opinions offered by the perceived unbiased and balanced commissioners. 
The most notable commissions in Zimbabwe are the Dumbutshena and 
the Chihambakwe, established to address the violence that occurred in the 
first few years of independence. In the post-Mugabe era, Mnangagwa also 
resorted to the same approach to deal with the post-election disturbances, 
the best example being the Motlanthe Commission. This was a response to 
the violence instigated by the opposition supporters who violently protested 
against what they saw as delays by the Zimbabwe Election Commission to 
announce the results of the presidential elections. The Commissions have 
not facilitated meaningful reconciliation in the country, either because 
of vague or suppressed findings, or due to a lack of political will to fully 
implement recommendations. Despite having been established to investigate 
human rights abuses over the years, most of the commissions have ref lected 
power relations in Zimbabwe. Most of the commissions, particularly those 
established under former President Mugabe’s government, may thus be 
viewed as state-crafted pseudo-commissions of inquiry, which were part of 
the cover up of some officials’ role in the violations. 
The political dispensation brought in by the inclusive government in 
2009 culminated in the formation of the Organ on National Healing, 
Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI). The mandate of the Organ 
was derived from Article VII of the Global Political Agreement which 
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empowered parties of the inclusive government to consider setting up 
mechanisms to render advice on issues pertaining to healing, cohesion and 
national unity in respect of pre- and post-independence political conf licts 
(Zimbabwe: Global Political Agreements 2008). The Organ failed because 
the inclusive government’s commitment to the objectives of national 
healing, integration and reconciliation was weak (Machakanja 2010:3; 
Eppel and Raftopoulos 2008:14). The politicians leading the Organ could in 
any case not separate their political party agendas from the national project 
(Machakanja 2011:8), and they were completely snubbing the past (Benyera 
2014:184). The whole process also excluded people from participating in the 
conception and implementation of the vision (Hapanyengwi-Chemhuru 
2013:96; Mbire 2011:22). 
During this stage, the government in Zimbabwe, most notably, under 
Mugabe’s tutelage, had a record of engaging in elite pacts, promoting 
amnesia and establishing barren commissions that ignored the unresolved 
past and merely attempted to restore cordial relations among political rivals. 
This yielded pseudo-reconciliation and compounded the crisis of efficacy 
in government interventions. The acknowledgement that reconciliation 
is still needed is aptly expressed in Chapter 12 of the new constitution 
adopted in 2013, indicating the extent to which the nation is committed 
to address its past. The hope for successful reconciliation is thus still alive. 
It was Mnangagwa’s reform-oriented government which has generated new 
interest in reconciliation.
Section 251 (1) of the constitution states: ‘For a period of ten years after 
the effective date, there is a commission to be known as the National 
Peace and Reconciliation Commission ...’. In terms of Section 252 of the 
Constitution, the NPRC has at least ten responsibilities. Three major foci 
anchor the mandate of the NPRC to the goals of reconciliation, namely: 
to ensure post-conf lict justice, healing and reconciliation; to develop and 
implement programmes to promote national healing, unity and cohesion 
in Zimbabwe and the peaceful resolution of disputes; and to bring about 
national reconciliation by encouraging people to tell the truth about the 
past and facilitating the making of amends and the provision of justice.
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These three terms of reference for the Commission are consistent with 
the desire for sustainable peace in Zimbabwe. However, questions remain 
concerning the effectiveness of the institution, given the precedent of past 
efforts (see Tshuma 2019). I strongly believe that the NPRC has latent 
potential such that, if it becomes malleable enough to shift responses to some 
strategy based on inclusive and participatory approaches at the community 
level, its aims for reconciliation can be achieved. The strategy of the NPRC 
should underscore the rediscovery of localism (grassroots initiatives). The 
notion of grassroots-sensitive peacebuilding emphasises the empowerment 
of locals and their community leadership to overcome violent turns of 
mind and avoid attendant destructive outcomes – transforming relations 
and developing capacities for better management of divisive issues. This 
is why experiences from comparable countries are important. However, 
before I examine such experiences, I put forth the conceptual framework 
which illuminates the lived experiences and the lessons I subsequently 
proffer for the NPRC’s attention. 
Conceptual framework
Reconciliation is a complex concept because of its multidimensional 
nature: one can approach it through a variety of disciplines (Torrent 
Oliva 2011:20). Two dimensions or perspectives are especially pertinent. 
The first one focuses on reconciliation as an outcome; a state in which parties 
have changed their relationships and are mutually recognising each other’s 
goals and interests in a peaceful environment (Howard 2004:197; Bar-tal 
and Bennink 2004:11–15). The second perspective shifts attention to how 
reconciliation unfolds vis-à-vis motivations, goals, beliefs, and emotions 
of parties. According to this perspective, the victim and the perpetrator 
have an opportunity to transform the nature of their relationship into one 
that facilitates the emergence of a new social context that is accompanied 
by possibilities for a peaceful future (Daly and Sarkin 2004:180–182; Maoz 
2004:225; Lederach 1997:101–110). Conceived as a process, reconciliation 
places weight not only on ending violence or conf lict, but also on the 
steps that lead to the construction of new relationships in which both 
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victims and perpetrators benefit from the new environment. The process 
takes place in efforts and activities that are deliberately meant to address 
unresolved conf lict. Our understanding is that as long as people previously 
involved in conf lict do not undergo this process, the conf lict persists and 
the potential for relapse is ever present. The objective of this process, then, 
is to understand the conf lict context in order to encourage people to get 
together in conditions that encourage long-term peace. If such long-term 
peace based on mutual assurance for living together is indeed attained, it 
becomes the outcome of a successful process. Treating reconciliation as 
both a process and an outcome entails that building relationships is key, 
since conf licts occur when relationships are disrupted, and they end when 
relationships are mended (Saunders and Slim 1994:43; Assefa 1993). 
Operationalising the process of how reconciliation unfolds and creates the 
desired outcomes (relationships that encourage peaceful contexts) has and 
must face challenges in real situations. However, there is a general consensus 
that desired outcomes can be successfully achieved if the process embraces 
and promotes five fundamental prerequisites – truth, apology, forgiveness, 
reparation and promoting encounter. These should be implemented in 
chronological order as follows: 
•	 The truth, or a close approximation of it, needs to be exposed to enable 
parties to understand their common history: an important basis for 
shared beliefs. However, appropriate mechanisms are needed to deal 
with complex situations since parties may find it difficult to eliminate 
bias in their narratives (Daly and Sarkin 2004:146).
•	 Apology marks the formal acceptance of responsibility by perpetrators, 
and is the basis for forgiveness by victims.
•	 Forgiveness embodies the values of love, empathy and mercy. Together 
with truth and apology, forgiveness constitutes the moral foundation of 
the reconciliation process. 
•	 Reparation involves the retribution the perpetrator needs to pay to the 
victim in order to rediscover a lost relationship.
•	 Initiatives to promote encounters should be implemented to promote 
a positive and constructive interaction between the previously 
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antagonised parties. This stage brings parties to the state of being 
reconciled. 
The five prerequisites are to be pursued in a context of justice. But yet 
another challenge arises as to which approach to justice best serves the goal 
to sustain reconciliation. Indeed, justice remains necessary and constitutes 
the first condition for human co-existence (Soyinka 1999), as it acts as 
a countervailing force to harmful past experiences (Pemberton, Van Eck-
Aarten and Mulder 2017:683). The justice needs of victims of transgressions 
are two dimensional (Pemberton, Van Eck-Aarten, and Mulder 2017:686; 
Wenzel et al. 2008). On one hand, the perpetrator’s violations represent 
a challenge to the victim’s status and power which may justify the need 
for retributive justice. On the other, transgressions by the perpetrator also 
jeopardise the values shared with the victim and the community in which 
the act occurred, which vindicates the need for restorative justice. Since the 
merits and demerits of the two forms of justice are appropriately addressed 
in other works (Wenzel et al. 2008; Daly and Sarkin 2004; Hamber 2003; 
Hayner 2002; Kriesberg 2001, among others), it may be sufficient here to 
state that choices made on the form of justice to be pursued should resonate 
with the context of a particular society and conf lict. Every social or conf lict 
context has its own peculiarities which demand justice that responds to its 
nuances. In terms of methodology, the argument in this article is that the 
approach to the interventions should be sensitive to local or community-
based specificities. A victim and a perpetrator residing within the same 
community have a smaller relational distance and share common values, 
and in such a case reconciliation that is informed by a restorative approach 
should be favoured. 
To better understand the space of community-based interventions in 
reconciliation, reference to what has been termed the ‘local turn’ in the 
peacebuilding literature is worthwhile. The concept of ‘local turn’ is an 
argument that began in the 1990s with the works of Lederach, gained 
eminence in the 2000s (Paffenholz 2015), and emphasises the recourse 
to localism in reconciliation (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013:763). 
It represents a challenge to the traditional liberal view of a peacebuilding 
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approach of universal applicability and focuses on the core proposition 
that there are different ways of approaching the problem of reconciliation. 
This revisionism is situated in the critical peace research, and alternative 
sociological, ethnographic and action research methods as well as post-
colonial scholarship. The premise of this logic is that society is plural and 
that communities exercise their agency for peace differently (Mac Ginty 
and Richmond 2013:764). These differences stem from the disparities in 
the cultural values, practices and norms of the locales that tend to inform 
how people at various levels of the same society define and achieve peace.
The critique insists that the liberal approach is an affront to democracy, 
which should be preoccupied with localised rights, needs and identities 
(Paris 2010). Liberalism assumes that the local is an extension of the 
international and national models. The world is considered globalised and 
models of peacebuilding are seen as universal (Paffenholz 2015:862–868). 
At the national level, the argument has been that the nation is one, and 
the state has the moral obligation to prescribe initiatives for the locals. 
The problem of power relations in reconciliation comes to the fore. 
But for the localism brigade, the liberal arguments are fundamentally 
f lawed (Mac Ginty 2015; Paffenholz 2015; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; 
Paris 2010). Liberals discourage the proper understanding of how the ‘local 
turn’ encourages more understanding of local rights, needs and identity 
in diverse contexts and plural societies. Imposing the will of the national 
leadership on the local may have some uses, but there are severe limitations 
to this. Thus we are led to the argument that the state should not be the 
primary referent in peace initiatives. However, its facilitation role has never 
been questioned. 
This author embraces these criticisms of the liberal solution, will examine 
the persistent problems of reconciliation in Zimbabwe and will propose to 
open space for other understandings and approaches. I have a conviction 
that ‘Engaging with the local highlights … the need for space to be created 
by concerted and well-targeted activities for peace to form locally’ (Mac 
Ginty and Richmond 2013:771). This encourages local consent, legitimacy 
and sustainability of interventions and minimises external interests, biases 
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and ideologies (Mac Ginty 2015). Certainly, the sheer heterogeneity of 
the sources of localised thinking and expression means that there is no 
neat framework of ideas that will satisfy the needs of every community 
in a uniform way. I emphasise this approach for the NPRC as I review 
experiences from Sierra Leone and East Timor.
Community reconciliation in practice
The cases examined hereunder are of comparable settings to those of 
Zimbabwe. The countries attempted to overcome past human rights 
violations and schisms after authoritarian regimes were deposed. Similar 
challenges had to be overcome in Zimbabwe when its NPRC was established. 
Community reconciliation process in East Timor
East Timor was a Portuguese colony until independence in 1974. From 
then until 1999, however, the country was occupied by Indonesia. 
The resistance against this occupation and the Timorese people’s on-going 
struggle for independence resulted in a backlash from the Indonesian 
administration that led to more than 100 000 deaths (Larke 2009:652). 
The most acute eruption of state-sponsored violence occurred between 
August and November 1999, in which 60 000 homes were destroyed, more 
than 250 000 people were displaced and 1 400 killed (McAuliffe 2008:36). 
The legacy of mistrust and hostility within the population, left by both 
the Portuguese and the Indonesian rule, provoked a myriad of disputes 
and fault-lines which created a highly polarised society. The occupation of 
Indonesia was ended by a United Nations (UN) -sponsored referendum that 
asked the Timorese whether they preferred to be independent or integrated 
with Indonesia. This was to be known as the Popular Consultation. 
Since Indonesia preferred amalgamation, it co-opted local Timorese into 
Indonesia’s formal security forces and proxy militias who perpetrated 
much of the violence and repression to enforce unification. The violence 
and displacement that occurred created fissures among the Timorese, and 
divided them into distinctly pro-independence and anti-independence 
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supporters. More than 80% voted in favour of independence (Babo-Soares 
2004:15–16), which brought a window of ephemeral stability.  
Another wave of political violence began in 2006 and climaxed during the 
presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2007. International actors 
responded by ameliorating the humanitarian situation. The political crisis 
was sparked by infighting among senior politicians, leading to escalated 
tension over long-term grievances such as land ownership. This was 
accompanied by regional divisions based on stereotyping and mythology, 
by widespread disenfranchisement of young people, and by the legacy of 
colonial violence, impunity and injustice (Larke 2009:647). In general, the 
East Timorese were found in the situation of a nation of systemic repression. 
The political violence had affected people’s relationships from individual 
and community to national levels. 
Once the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) assumed control, it worked closely with a Timorese government-
in-waiting to give attention to issues of justice and accountability as an 
integral component of establishing governance through rule of law. 
Justice was therefore viewed as a pre-condition for reconciliation and 
as essential to the peace and security of the newly independent state. 
A South African-style Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
(CRTR) was then established, which had objectives similar to conventional 
TRCs, but represented a marked departure in as far as it sought to support 
‘the reception and reintegration of individuals who had caused harm to 
their communities through the commission of minor criminal offences 
and other harmful acts through the facilitation of community-based 
mechanisms for reconciliation’ (Larke 2009:657). The CRTR represented a 
statist approach or official reconciliation whose emphasis was on bridging 
political differences among political leaders. It was believed that this would 
facilitate the reconciliation of their supporters. The elite-driven emphasis 
meant that little attention was given to healing the wounds of the past, 
and that the involvement of the people at community level was minimal. 
Along the same lines, the Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) was 
conceptualised and supported by the central authority.
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The mandate of the CRP was challenging in as far as it also involved 
upholding the dignity and interests of both victims and perpetrators in 
a manner consistent with universal human rights but remaining locally 
relevant and meaningful. Before the commencement of the CRP’s work, 
community consultations were held, and during these the desirability of 
involving customary justice procedures known as adat or lisa (sacred laws 
or beliefs on which local justice is based) was emphasised. This indicated 
that traditional justice approaches retained a strong inf luence among the 
Timorese (McAuliffe 2008:658). In the design of the CRP, adat leaders 
were invited to participate in the hearings. The hearings were conducted 
in a way that sought to incorporate features from a common customary 
conf lict resolution ceremony, known as nahe biti boot (to spread the big 
mat). The process essentially involves bringing the conf licting parties 
together in a public meeting where they sit facing one another separated by 
the community leaders. However, in the CRP process, adat leaders assumed 
more ceremonial than their supposed jury roles, while mediation between 
the parties was facilitated by a panel of prominent community members, 
chaired by a senior CRP staff member.
The CRP process was voluntary and it aimed at reconciling the perpetrator 
and the community which was harmed. Even if individual victims were 
involved, the priority of the CRP was reconciliation in the community 
at large. The CRP would explain its aims and principles, and encourage 
individuals estranged from their communities by virtue of their past acts 
to seek community-based agreements that required them to admit wrong-
doing, apologise and agree to some sort of sanction, symbolic or otherwise. 
However, the majority were just required to apologise and only a few were 
sanctioned with community service or symbolic fines. At the end of a CRP 
hearing, the agreement reached was registered with the formal justice 
system. This meant that the traditional mechanisms were integrated to the 
formal legal system. The CRP operated for 18 months and over 15 000 cases 
were heard. 
The main strength of the CRP is that it emphasised ‘survivor justice’ as 
opposed to the usual binary of victim justice versus perpetrator justice. 
48
Lawrence Mhandara
The politically neutral term ‘deponent’ was used to refer to what would 
be called a ‘perpetrator’ under similar circumstances. This sent a positive 
signal to the community that victims and perpetrators alike had a shared 
identity: being lucky as survivors to have escaped the violence which 
was perpetrated in the name of politics (Larke 2009:559). The process 
was therefore oriented to restorative, as opposed to retributive, justice. 
The community-level processes of shaming were more effective than 
centralised methods of punishing offenders. Braithwaite (2003:81) argues 
that ‘Both the specific and general deterrent effects of shame will be greater 
for persons who remain strongly attached in relationships of interdependency 
and affection because such persons accrue greater interpersonal costs of 
shame’. The circumstances in which CRP operated leant themselves well to 
the employment of shame as a means of punishment and deterrence, given 
that most of the people who participated in the violence had taken part in 
acts against members of their own villages (Burgess 2004:147).
The CRP has however been criticised for a number of reasons. Confessional 
narratives used were assumed to constitute the truth. In reality, however, 
it is difficult to gauge whether the testifying individuals were telling the 
whole truth – as only known by themselves. Also difficult to determine 
was the sincerity of the remorse and repentance felt by perpetrators. 
This was complicated by the fact that remorse was made mandatory for 
participation in the process. Sincerity of remorse is indeed always difficult 
to tell. In addition, the mandate of the CRP was severely limited as it was 
only allowed to address low-level acts, while the all-important serious 
acts were left in the hands of the formal justice system. The assumption 
that people are not able to reconcile over serious acts is not true, however. 
Another limitation was that the CRP process was perpetrator-driven 
to such an extent that victims and the community were not afforded an 
opportunity for personal testimony. Their role was merely supportive, by 
providing additional information about what the perpetrators omitted or 
by intervening with clarifying questions. Also, the process was not gender-
sensitive, and women were excluded from the process either as deponents 
or victims. On the whole, therefore, the CRP was not adequate to address 
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the needs of victims. Instead, its focus was on integrating perpetrators 
into the communities from which they had been distanced due to their 
past acts. Moreover, the CRP assumed that all communities had similar 
contexts, such that its methodology was uniform throughout. Staub and 
others (2005:299), however, note that interventions ‘have to be applied and 
adapted to particular circumstances, so that practices will vary depending 
on the specifics of culture, current social conditions, and the history of 
group relations’. The CRP was uniform across all communities in that it 
did not consult people in the conceptualisation of the intervention (Babo-
Soares 2004:23). Nevertheless, it played a key role in restoring social 
stability by addressing social fissures created by political violence at the 
community level.
The Fambul tok project in Sierra Leone
Political problems in Sierra Leone led the West African country to a callous 
civil war, starting in 1991 and ending in 2002. The war was fought between 
Liberian rebels, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in alliance with the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), against the Sierra Leonean 
government and the government-aligned Civil Defence Forces (CDF). 
The civil war was precipitated by government mismanagement of diamond 
wealth, and political repression in the context of a one-party system (Park 
2010; Keen 2005; Richards 2002). The conf lict resulted in widespread 
atrocities, murder and sexual violence committed against civilians by 
combatants (Park 2010; Shocken 2002). 
To address the transgressions, Sierra Leone adopted two principal 
transitional justice institutions: the Special Court for Sierra Leone; and 
the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The Special 
Court was established in 2002, with the support of the UN, and essentially 
represented a war crimes tribunal. Commentary on the court, however, 
pointed to a myriad of challenges and controversies, despite sentiments of 
broad public support (Park 2010:100). A persistent critique of the institution 
is contained in other works (Park 2010; Dougherty 2004; Shocken 2002; 
Cryer 2001). One of the main criticisms was that the retributive processes 
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of the Court presented an obstacle to unveiling the truth and the criminal 
trials became barriers to reconciliation. The TRC, however, was focused 
on accomplishing national reconciliation, healing victims and preventing 
a repetition of atrocities (Hayner 2002:15–16; Park 2010:101). The TRC 
was established under an Act of Parliament. Its mandate was to create an 
impartial historical record of violations of human rights and to address 
impunity; to respond to the needs of the victims; to promote healing and 
reconciliation; and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses 
suffered. The TRC report has been analysed in detail elsewhere (Kelsall 
2005; Dougherty 2004). It had weaknesses, however, chief of which was 
its lack of adequate focus on reconciliation – although its emphasis was on 
restorative rather than punitive justice. Reconciliation efforts ‘were largely 
left to the localities because the TRC had neither the time nor the money 
to do that’ (Dougherty 2004:44). The TRC was also overly engrossed with 
the truth component at the expense of other requirements of the process 
(Park 2010:103). Thus, notwithstanding the important contributions of 
both the Special Court and TRC to transitional justice in Sierra Leone, 
both institutions left gaps which called for community-based initiatives. 
No wonder that, five years after the submission of the TRC report, a new 
strategy for dealing with war abuses emerged in 2007: to continue the work 
of reconciliation at the community level. The initiative known as Fambul 
tok was fronted by a coalition of civil society organisations operating as the 
Forum of Conscience. 
Fambul tok (meaning family talk) was a programme designed to conduct 
community reconciliation after the completion of the TRC. On realising 
that there was a lack of community reconciliation in the TRC process, 
the civil society initiative set structures in liaison with traditional leaders 
to facilitate reconciliation (Park 2010:113). The programme sought the 
reconciliation of offenders, victims and their communities. The project 
was oriented towards restoration, and was underpinned by objectives of 
reconciliation, forgiveness, acknowledgement and remorse. It was about 
acknowledgement of wrong-doing and not forgetting the past. The project 
facilitated the gradual mending and building of relationships. The family 
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talk initiative was based on the traditional practice of discussing and 
resolving issues within the security of a family circle. The project operated 
at village level, however, in order to help communities organise ceremonies 
that included truth-telling and traditional cleansing. Public disclosures 
of their experiences and actions could therefore be made by both victims 
and perpetrators. In this way, the Fambul tok events were designed and 
controlled by each community, based on their own traditions. The project 
went beyond the TRC in bringing people together. It managed to achieve 
what the TRC and the Special Court had failed to achieve, at least at the 
grassroots level.
Lessons for the NPRC
The Community-level interventions examined show that while grassroots-
centred initiatives foster healing and reconciliation, there are different ways 
in which the process may occur depending on the choice of a particular 
locale. This strengthens the dictum that ‘there is no single healing and 
reconciliation process but what is called for is a blend of transforming 
activities at community level, while attending to individuals’ and 
community needs’ (Hamber 2001:79). Community-level interventions, 
it appears, are an important feature of facilitating reconciliation, giving 
credence to the belief that sustainable peacebuilding should be domestically 
rooted and embraced by the local population and not imported or imposed 
(Mani 2002:14). Both the Fambul tok and the CRP utilised their local 
knowledge and beliefs to deal with their conf licts. However, support 
from governments enhances effectiveness of interventions, as the CRP 
demonstrates. The CRP and Fambul tok experiences further exemplify how 
interventions should acknowledge people as inherently interdependent, 
and how the focus should be more on restorative processes and less on 
punitive ones. The purpose of the NPRC interventions should therefore be 
to facilitate national reconciliation through a community-driven strategy. 
Reconciliation is likely to be achieved when the society is accorded the 
opportunity to recover when the five prerequisites of truth, apology, 
forgiveness, reparation and encounter are enabled at the local level. 
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The NPRC should consider that for any reconciliation process to work, 
the affected people need to first openly acknowledge the problems that 
divided them in order to effectively engage. This is important to ensure 
that the people see the problem as shared, which fosters restoration of 
broken relationships. In turn, this helps victims to relieve themselves of 
their despair, insecurity and suspicion, while perpetrators will be able to 
reconnect and move away from the feeling of isolation. These considerations 
are captured in the CRP process. Notwithstanding its weaknesses, the 
utility of localism in reconciliation exhibited in the process include the 
following aspects:
•	 The process responded to the five requirements for a successful process, 
namely, truth, apology, forgiveness, reparation and encounter between 
the victim and the perpetrator.
•	 While the victim needs were not ignored, more emphasis was directed 
at the reconciliation of the community as a whole.
•	 Agreements reached at the community level were registered with the 
formal justice system to encourage parties to respect their obligations.
•	 The community process was largely dependent on shaming as a form 
of punishment, which proved to be more effective than the state-level 
methods of punishing offenders.
•	 In experiencing the CRP process, however, weaknesses were noted. 
Issues were not addressed holistically and gender sensitivity was not 
taken into account. The implied positive lesson is therefore that a 
healthy balance should be struck with regard to the needs of victims, 
perpetrators and the community – and the representation of both 
genders.
On its part, the Fambul tok was based on traditional practices at a village 
level, allowing each community to exercise control over the process. 
Although the intervention was initiated by the civil society, the NPRC can 
as well strengthen its existing synergies with the civil society to support 
similar efforts at the micro level. It should therefore take the following 
considerations seriously.
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•	 The NPRC needs to acknowledge that while it is a creature of central 
government, centralised approaches are insulated from the aspirations 
of the people. Its central methods need to be complemented by local 
initiatives as the Fambul tok did when the centralised methods of the 
Special Court and the TRC faltered.
•	 Reconciliation processes appear to work if they have meaning for 
the society affected, ‘including various collectivistic contents that 
are seen as intrinsic parts of the universal whole recognised within a 
cultural context’ (Machinga and Friedman 2013:54). The process must 
be sensitive to the culturally congruent practices of the community 
targeted. 
•	 Traditional beliefs provide a significant source for healing and 
reconciliation. Such beliefs should not be ignored or glossed over in the 
work of the NPRC. Indeed, Zimbabwe is a country with heterogeneous 
socio-cultural needs which are not amenable to uniform approaches. 
The lessons from the cases examined are also reinforced by findings from 
a survey of 21 locally-based peace interventions. Dessel and Rogge (2008 
cited in Mhandara 2018:31–32) conclude that there were multiple benefits 
in peacebuilding programmes in which the locals assumed central agency.
Lessons from other countries do not make much sense, of course, if 
practical local mechanisms are not available. In Zimbabwe, however, 
community-based reconciliation has already been explored in response to 
the incidents of political conf lict, and the NPRC can build its efforts on 
these localised initiatives. For example, Machinga and Friedman (2013:53–
62) evaluate an individual and community level programme known as 
the Lament, Welcome and Celebrate (LAWECE) which was implemented 
in the local communities of Mutare. The purpose of the LAWECE was to 
allow people to live together by fostering personal healing, interpersonal 
relationship recovery and community rebuilding. Their study concluded 
that the initiative’s most significant benefit was its ability to utilise local 
knowledge at a micro-level. Further approaches relying on indigenous and 
local knowledge to resolve past conf licts and recreate relationships from the 
family to community level have been explored in recent empirical studies. 
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Their merits and demerits have been extensively explained in literature, 
and, taking everything into account, some of them may surely be considered 
by the NPRC. For example, botso (self-shaming), chenura (cleansing 
ceremonies), nyaradzo (memorials), kuripa ngozi (appeasing spirits), and 
nhimbe (community working groups) (Chivasa 2019:159–179; Mandikwaza 
2018:45–51; Makumbirofa 2016:61–73; Benyera 2014:196–250).  
Conclusion
The article has examined enriching case studies of community 
reconciliation in two countries: the CRP in East Timor, and the Fambul tok 
in Sierra Leone. In all cases, it has been noted that community initiatives 
were adopted not only after episodes of political violence, but also when it 
was realised that centralised approaches were ineffective. In East Timor, 
there were numerous challenges, but the CRP employed mechanisms 
which demonstrated that shaming is more effective in reconciling people 
than formal legal methods of punishing offenders. Similarly, the Fambul 
tok project demonstrates the efficacy of a restorative process in which 
local people have total control over the process, and how the use of 
local traditions can foster reconciliation. By and large, valuable lessons 
have been derived from the two cases, and these may be considered by 
the NPRC in order to refine strategies which can confront the lingering 
question of reconciliation in Zimbabwe. Primarily, initiatives are likely to 
work provided they have meaning among the affected communities. That 
is, interventions ought to be congruent with local cultural practices and 
traditional beliefs that serve as a vital cog in reintegrating people driven 
asunder by violent conf licts. Also important is how restorative-justice 
processes have been used in both cases, encouraging interventions that 
treat people as inherently interdependent, and initiatives that concentrate 
more on integrative processes than on vengeance. 
The above-mentioned lessons make it clear that the NPRC should not 
be cajoled into centralised and exclusionary interventions that frustrate 
or inhibit local agency in reconciliation. Each community should be 
supported to decide the process according to its own local conditions. 
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The evidence from East Timor provides proof of how a government can 
facilitate reconciliation without taking responsibility away from the locals. 
The emphasis on community-based approaches highlights the contribution 
of this study to the reconciliation debate by demonstrating that although 
reconciliation processes and outcomes are f luid, micro-level realities 
should not be neglected. The NPRC still has a window of opportunity 
to strengthen the resilience of communities through investing in, and 
supporting, the practice of local reconciliation methods. Indeed, the 
traditional liberal view of some universal approach to reconciliation has for 
long been discredited, and prevailing wisdom suggests that due to diverse 
cultural values, practices and norms, communities should be backed by 
national institutions when exercising their agency for peace.
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